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 The Slovenes formed both their country and their national identity 
under Austria-Hungary. Until the end of the nineteenth century, they 
perceived themselves mainly as residents of historical provinces whose 
formation can be traced back to the Middle Ages (i.e., as Carniolans, 
Styrians, Carinthians, or Istrians), and at the supranational level as loyal 
subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy. The national program created in 1848 
did not extend beyond demands for Slovene autonomy and the use of their 
own language. 
 Some Slovene intellectuals were convinced that Slovenes should 
follow the Germans because they were a higher and better developed nation. 
This attitude was called nemškutarstvo, indicating a preference for the 
German language and culture, and it was strongly rejected by both the 
Catholic and liberal political orientations. The uncompromising defense of 
the national position also had an influence on internal politics. The Slovene 
political mentality that developed at the end of the nineteenth century grew 
from the idea that opponents must either be totally subjugated or be 
classified among national enemies. This remained a basic characteristic in 
all three political camps (Catholic, liberal, and socialist/communist) 
throughout the twentieth century. One exception was the period when 
independence was attained during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 As far as parliamentarianism is concerned, only the “fragmentary” 
development of particular periods from the second half of the nineteenth 
century onwards can be discussed. Slovenia’s national parliament (in the 
modern sense, with universal voting and a multiparty system) has been in 
operation uninterruptedly for only eighteen years. The majority of this 
period was also a time (probably unique in Slovene history) of “absolute” 
independence, because earlier Slovene legislative bodies had only local 
significance or were subordinate to other bodies, as is now again the case 
with European Union membership.1 
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the idea of 
“trialism” prevailed (according to which Austro-Hungary was to be divided 
into German, Hungarian, and South Slav parts, the last to include the 
Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats in the monarchy). With the disintegration of 
                                                
1 For more on this subject, see Repe (2000: 27–28). 
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Austria-Hungary and inclusion into the newly established Yugoslav state, 
the Slovenes faced the dilemma of whether to preserve their national 
identity or instead become a part of the new “Yugoslav” nation. Another 
turnabout was that the Austrians (or Germans) were now a minority, and the 
Slovenes had assumed the role of the majority (Dolenc 2004, Ferenc and 
Repe 2004). 
 The Slovenes did preserve their language and cultural autonomy, 
and their Austrian (or Habsburg) identity was replaced with a Yugoslav 
identity (Čepič et al. 2005). Under communist Yugoslavia, the status of the 
Slovenes actually improved: they were granted the constitutional right to 
self-determination, including the right to secession. However, hardly any 
thought was given to the latter until the mid-1980s, when Yugoslavia was 
shaken by a huge economic crisis and the centuries-old fear of the Germans 
and Italians had gradually faded. 
 Alongside appreciating their national identity, Slovenes today still 
maintain strong regional identities. That of Prekmurje is believed to be the 
most distinctive, partially because the people of this region were secluded in 
the Hungarian part of the monarchy for centuries. In contrast, supranational 
European identity is still weak and in a formative stage. 
 Although accepted by most historians, the development described 
above often conflicts with national myths and ideological-political 
interpretations. One such myth originates from the belief that the Slovenes 
were the original settlers of the area they now inhabit, as a homogeneous 
nation, and that the Slovene language and literacy stem from that period. 
Among the diverse popular theories of the origin of the Slovenes (Etruscan, 
Illyrian, Venetic, etc.), the “Venetic theory” has attracted the most attention. 
Another myth concerns the continuous identity of the Slovenes from the 
sixth century onwards, the lost state of Carantania, and the eternal longing 
for it. Part of this search for links can be observed in symbols; for example, 
the suggestion that Slovenia’s coat of arms incorporate the Carantanian 
panther— according to Joško Šavli, the very symbol of every Slovene 
(Šavli 1993; see also other articles by the same author). The central theme 
of this story is that the Slavs (in the mythic variation, the Slovenes 
themselves) inhabited their present territory as Avar subjects towards the 
end of the sixth century, and then managed to establish their own state, to be 
later enslaved by the Germans. They remained under German domination 
until World War I (and Carinthia, the “cradle of the Slovenehood,” remains 
so forever). 
 Such mythology seems typical of all central European (as well as 
other) nations, which are believed to have had a kind of state (later lost) in 
the early Middle Ages—even though nationality played no role during those 
times (see also Vodopivec 2006: 53). In reality, observes Peter Štih, 
people’s identities were different in those times. People living north of the 
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Karawanken Mountains perceived themselves as Carantanians, and were 
also addressed as such by their Bavarian and Langobard neighbors, whereas 
those living to the south of the mountains were called Carnolians. They 
were both of Slavic origin, yet by no means Slovenes (Štih 2006: 32–33). 
Štih further claims that the Carantanians were first made into Slovenes only 
at the time of Linhart (the term Slovenes was first mentioned in Trubar’s 
Catechism of 1550, and the term Slovenia even later, in an 1844 poem by 
Jovan Vesel Koseski); to speak about Slovenes in the early Middle Ages is 
nothing less than nationalizing history in retrospect; it is the creation of an 
imaginary picture of national history before it even started. As outlined at 
the beginning, regional identity prevailed among the Slovenes until the end 
of the nineteenth century. It is nonetheless a fact that the Carantanians can 
be seen as ancestors of the Slovenes, although not the only ones. 
 A particularly strong myth is related to the powerful feudal family 
of the Counts of Celje. Centuries later, the three stars from their coat of 
arms is found in the coat of arms of the Republic of Slovenia; even earlier, 
these stars were a part of the “composite” coat of arms of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia.2 The Counts of Celje are believed to have been of Slovene 
origin, and the principality of Celje to have been a Slovene medieval state. 
According to the nineteenth-century author Janez Trdina, Herman of 
Celje—who also governed Bosnia and Slavonia—actually founded the 
grand Yugoslav (medieval) state. According to some other authors, only 
South Slavs would have lived under their leadership in the southern parts of 
their territories, had the Counts of Celje not become extinct. Vlado Habjan 
believed that their extinction represented the loss of a family that could have 
acted as a cohesive social force and the potential founder of a (Slovene) 
state (Habjan 1995; see also other articles by the same author). 
 The strongest myth that contradicts the historical fact of Slovenes 
as people with a regional identity, and strives to establish them as a nation 
in retrospect, persisted well into the twentieth century. This is the myth 
about the Slovenes’ continuing “national rise” (Prunk 1992). It was 
nourished by the belief that the Slovenes had been longing for their own 
state since time immemorial, and declared it for the first time in the 
Zedinjena Slovenija (United Slovenia) program in 1848. In the years to 
follow they strove to realize this goal within various historical 
circumstances, and finally succeeded in 1991. In fact, only a small number 
of intellectuals stood behind the program, whose objective was not the 
founding of a separate state, but a union of Slovenes within a self-governed 
unit with its own national assembly. Nor did the trialist program from the 
beginning of the twentieth century strive for an independent Slovene state 
                                                
2  Vlado Habjan, Tri zlate zvezde ne modrem ščitu simbolično kažejo našo trojno 
usodo: predlog k izbiranju grba Republike Slovenije, Delo 20 November 1990, 
11 
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(which, for example, the Czechs demanded for themselves), but for internal 
division of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into three parts. 
 The one-month existence of the transitional State of the Slovenes, 
Croats, and Serbs in 1918, with its seat in Zagreb, was claimed to 
demonstrate the existence of Slovene aspirations for statehood (even 
including elements of international recognition). Although the Slovenes had 
their own government within it, they failed to establish their own 
parliament. The State of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (or SHS) first 
began to be mentioned as an expression of Slovene aspirations for statehood 
in the 1970s, and achieved its peak after independence with the thesis on 
“the Slovene attainment of independence in 1918” (Perovšek 1998). 
Between the two world wars, political programs did not extend beyond a 
demand for autonomy; during World War II as well, the objectives of both 
the partisan and the anti-partisan side was a united Slovenia within a federal 
Yugoslavia. However, only the partisan side actively fought to achieve this 
aim and consequently managed to bring about a shift of the Slovene border 
towards the west. It is true, however, that there were some diplomatic 
attempts in this direction among emigrant politicians as well. Depending on 
numerous factors, the issue of the borders of a united Slovenia remained 
open; to a great extent, it was a subject of international decisions—for 
example, the decision by the allies to restore Austria within its borders 
before its annexation by Nazi Germany, as well as their benevolence 
towards Italy, and, according to some historians, also the communist 
orientation of the national liberation movement. In spite of those facts, 
idealized programs according to which the borders of Slovenia were to be 
extended to as far as the Hohe Tauern range and the Tagliamento River 
emerged even during the war. The demand was to preserve the historical 
borders of Slovene settlements as they were at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, before the assimilation of Slovenes within Austria and 
Italy. The national liberation movement sought to reform Slovenes’ national 
character, and change the “nation of servants” (the image of the Slovenes 
from major literary works of the time, from Prešeren to Cankar) into a 
“nation of heroes,” which was even a point in the program of the Liberation 
Front. 
 In addition, Slovene political programs within communist 
Yugoslavia did not extend beyond federative and confederative status. 
Yugoslavia seemed to be a safe refuge from the worst national enemies: the 
Germans and the Italians. 
 Within professional circles, the discussion of this “national rise” 
peaked shortly after independence in 1992. After the 2004 election win by 
Slovenia’s center-right coalition, these discussions were revived. A 
distinctive political connotation could be observed, according to which the 
“peak” of the national rise and Slovene history in general was the 
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attainment of independence. This still appears to yield political advantage 
and seems to be a kind of ethical-political criterion for top political 
functions (Repe 2001: 11). However, few of today’s political parties and 
politicians can be linked to Slovenia’s attainment of independence. With its 
thesis about the “spring” parties (those believed to have favored Slovenia’s 
independence and democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s), the 
current ruling political block strives to obtain some sort of political capital 
from such undefined “mythization” of its (alleged) role. 
 The Slovenes established a different attitude towards each state 
formation they became part of. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the formerly 
glorified Catholic Austria with its beloved Emperor Franz Joseph was 
referred to as a “prison of nations,” although Austria enabled the Slovenes’ 
continued existence and preservation of their national identity; it facilitated 
their (albeit slow) economic development and taught them modern political 
manners, including parliamentarianism. After its downfall, a similar 
negative characterization was applied to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
following the collapse of the idealized image of the “three tribes of the same 
nation.” Although the Slovenes had received a university, prospects for 
economic development, and informal cultural autonomy, they did not have 
political autonomy. If not a myth, it is at least a stereotype that (according to 
Anton Korošec) “the Serbs govern, the Croats discuss, and the Slovenes 
pay” (Perovšek 2004, 427). In a slightly different form, this reappeared in 
the communist Yugoslavia that the Slovenes left because it had become an 
obstacle to their development, after the fear of the centuries-old German and 
Italian enemies gradually faded after the 1970s. Self-managed socialism—
“the best system in the world”—became totalitarianism, formerly beloved 
Comrade Tito became a dictator, and the myth of brotherhood, unity, and 
socialist patriotism turned to dust. 
 A new myth emerged in its place: this time the uncritically 
idealized goal was the notion of “Europe.”3 It presented Europe as internally 
undifferentiated, able to generally adapt to particular political interests. By 
following self-serving principles, for example, educational systems 
corresponding to particular lines of argumentation could be held up as 
examples, and likewise for church-state relations: adherents of religion in 
schools can cite Austria or Italy as a European example to be followed, 
whereas their opponents cite France, and so on. In their “rush towards 
Europe” Slovene politicians were, as always throughout history, overly 
compliant, even servile, and prepared to make smaller or larger concessions 
as a sign of “goodwill”—closing duty-free shops, introducing visas for 
Balkan states, recognizing an “Old Austrian” minority, and so on. 
                                                
3  Božo Repe, Gospodarji dveh tretjin Evrope: slovenski miti, Delo 30 October 
2003. 
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 Over time, a number of personalities, especially writers, who 
actually created the Slovene national community, experienced a similar 
transformation of their image. Now the “new era” personalities are 
attempting to correct this complex. 
 Especially within history as taught in schools, there has been a 
tendency to “nationally adopt” various personalities that were not of 
Slovene origin, but were born or lived within Slovene territory (e.g., the 
musician and composer Jakob Gallus or the chemist Fritz Pregl), or those 
that were Slovenes by birth, but had no affinity to their nationality (e.g., the 
inventor and mechanic that was christened Johannes Puch, but has been 
transformed into Janez Puh). 
 With the formation of an independent state, the dilemmas 
addressed above were not solved. Namely, the independent Slovene state 
was a result of political and social changes in the 1980s. These took place in 
the context of the global crisis of communism, disintegration of the bipolar 
division of the world, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as well as 
a deep political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia accompanied by a crisis 
in relationships among the various nations within the state. Independence 
would not have been possible without these external changes. The relatively 
fast progress of events took its course in many fields, including the question 
of identity. It was easy to abandon the Yugoslav identity, to develop a 
negative thought pattern concerning the former state—which after the 
collapse became synonymous with Balkanism, Byzantinism, and so on. 
Yugoslavia became a state that had economically and politically limited the 
Slovenes, prevented them from attaining independence, and kept them at a 
lower cultural level—that is, within a different cultural circle than the one to 
which the Slovenes were supposed to belong. This was all the easier 
because Yugoslavia was a communist (or rather, in Marxist terms, socialist) 
state and thereby an excellent target for a double criticism: national as well 
as ideological. From this experience in the 1990s originated the fear and 
opposition against establishing any institutional ties with the Balkan states. 
It was the general opinion that such a process might cause the country to 
slip from its status as a state “bordering on” a conflict area into the group of 
countries constituting that conflict area. In any proposition (e.g., stability 
pacts), politicians saw an aim to “push” Slovenia back into the Balkans to 
help stabilize and democratize the region. It was quite a shock at the 
beginning of 1994 when President Clinton’s special envoy Madeleine 
Albright, who came to Europe to explain the initiative for a Partnership for 
Peace, classified Slovenia as a “Balkan democracy” together with Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Albania.4 
                                                
4  Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji, Delo 15 January 1994. 
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 After joining the European Union and reestablishing political, 
economic, and cultural ties with the other former Yugoslav republics, fear 
disappeared (but not prejudices and a feeling of political and cultural 
superiority). On the other side, squeezed between the Germanic and 
Romance world, the Slovenes seem to be reviving national dilemmas from 
the end of the nineteenth century. The first negative signs from the past 
already appeared while negotiating for European Union membership, which 
ended with Slovenia signing the “Spanish compromise.”5 
 Doubtless, Slovene statehood was a tremendous and necessary 
historical achievement, especially viewed from the circumstances in 
Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Nevertheless, independence was achieved at a 
time when the classic nation state, based on nineteenth-century patterns of 
the national economy, defense system, foreign policy, currency, and other 
attributes (ranging as far as a national airline) is in decline in Europe. This 
is also at a time when the (nation) state, at least in the west, no longer 
represents the determining factor in protecting democratic rights because 
these are becoming universal. 
 At the same time, the question arises whether a state that views 
culture as the foundation of national identity (the concept “Slovene 
economy” long ago ceased to exist) and takes corresponding measures 
really supports (or is hindered by) Slovene backwardness. The sociologist 
Grega Tomc believes that we are facing the “Dežman case” once again.6 
According to Tomc, in two generations’ time there will be young people 
that ask themselves: 
. . . why should I drag up that “Slovenehood” if it is lagging 
behind so much and nothing interesting seems to be going on? 
Of course this will not be a conscious decision. There will 
simply be a growing number of Slovenes that will not support 
Slovene culture in their homes; a kind of silent assimilation 
will take hold. Nothing radical will happen at all; we will just 
                                                
5 In 1993, Italy demanded various concessions from Slovenia as a condition for 
not opposing the signing of the association agreement between Slovenia and the 
European Union. The key demand concerned the property of post–World War II 
Italian refugees from Istria and the Slovene Littoral, despite the fact that this 
issue had already been resolved with Yugoslavia. In a milder and more general 
form drafted after Spanish intervention, Slovenia’s parliament accepted the 
Italian demands in April 1996. Slovenia changed its constitution and obligated 
itself to open its real-estate market after ratification of the association agreement 
to EU citizens that had lived in Slovenia for at least three years. 
6 The politician Karel Dežman (1821–89) believed the Slovenes should accept the 
stronger and better developed German identity because they themselves were too 
weak to be able to follow such progress. 
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not be creative enough in comparison with the foreign 
environments. (Tomc 2007: 42) 
 The uncritically self-satisfied Slovene politicians believe that the 
Slovenes reached the peak of their history by attaining independence and 
forming a state, and that growth in gross national income (which, by the 
way, is less a result of innovativeness than of service and similar activities) 
indicates that Slovenes are on an upward path. However, critical 
intellectuals caution that the way backwards, from citizen of an independent 
state to a mere provincial man, is an equally realistic option if Slovenes 
continue to persist in today’s prevailing traditionalism, seclusion, and 
prejudices and do not manage to activate sufficient intellectual power 
(cultural, educational, and scholarly) to carry out the modernization 
processes that they have been unable to catch up with for over one hundred 
years. 
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